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From Cycles to Shocks: Progress in
Business-Cycle Theory
Satyajit Chatterjee*
Early analysts of business cycles believed that
each cyclical phase of the economy carries within
it the seed that generates the next cyclical phase.
A boom generates the next recession; that reces-
sion generates the next boom; and the economy
is caught forever in a self-sustaining cycle. In
contrast, modern theories of business cycles at-
tribute cyclical fluctuations to the cumulative
effects of shocks and disturbances that continu-
ally buffet the economy. In other words, without
shocks there are no cycles.
The evolution of thought about business
cycles from an emphasis on self-sustaining be-
havior toward one in which random shocks take
center stage is a significant development in mac-
roeconomics, and it is an especially important
one for policymaking institutions like the Fed-
eral Reserve. The view that cycles are self-sus-
taining implies that a market economy cannot
deliver stable economic performance on a sus-
tained basis.  Generally speaking, this view
points to aggressive countercyclical policies or
institutional reform as the appropriate response
to cyclical fluctuations.
In contrast, the view that shocks are the ulti-
mate sources of business cycles does not point
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to a particular policy stance. Whether a
countercyclical policy should be pursued de-
pends on the nature of the shocks. If shocks can
be eliminated, macroeconomic policy should
endeavor to do so because a more stable eco-
nomic environment is preferable to a less stable
one. But if shocks cannot be eliminated, it may
be in the long-run interests of society to adapt to
the shocks. To the extent that countercyclical
policies interfere with the necessary adaptations,
they may do more harm than good.1
Not surprisingly, the shift of professional
opinion toward the shock-based view of busi-
ness cycles has been accompanied by increas-
ing debate about the sources of cyclical volatil-
ity. Few macroeconomists doubt that random
shocks underlie business cycles, but they have
been unable to agree on which random shocks,
historically, have been the main causes of cycli-
cal volatility.
To a person not versed in business-cycle
theory (including economists who are not macro-
economists), this situation must seem somewhat
paradoxical: How can macroeconomists be cer-
tain that shocks cause cycles, yet not agree on
which shocks are responsible for cyclical volatil-
ity? Moreover, if a person is told that despite this
ignorance, macroeconomists have made great
strides in understanding business cycles, his or
her perplexity can only increase. How can there
be any understanding of business cycles (let
alone an improvement in it!) if economists don’t
know the causes of cyclical volatility?
This article will answer these questions by
sketching the historical evolution of the shock-
based theory of business cycles. The answer to
the first question delineates the key discoveries
that led macroeconomists away from the self-
sustaining view of business cycles and toward
the shock-based view. The impetus for the shock-
based view of business cycles came in the 1920s
when mathematicians made a major break-
through in the statistical description of cyclical
phenomena. They established that many kinds
of irregular cyclical phenomena (in fields as di-
verse as economics, geology, and physics) are
best explained by random shocks.
This discovery set economists on the search
for a shock-based theory of business cycles. Ini-
tially, economists thought that observable ran-
dom events, such as an unexpected increase in
government spending or a financial panic, would
turn out to be the shocks causing business cycles.
And to some extent they are. But they are not the
major source of cyclical volatility. The major
source appears to be shocks that manifest them-
selves as deviations of macroeconomic variables
from their model-predicted values.  Such shocks
cannot easily be connected to observable real-
world events. The unobservable nature of these
shocks is the fundamental reason macroecono-
mists disagree about the ultimate causes of cy-
clical fluctuations. Yet, most macroeconomists
agree that some set of unspecified shocks must
be ultimately responsible for business cycles.
Although macroeconomists lack firm knowl-
edge about the ultimate sources of cyclical vola-
tility, they do understand how these shocks, once
they occur, contribute to business cycles. Thus,
the answer to the second question is that ad-
vances in business-cycle theory have provided
a better understanding of how industrial econo-
mies respond to random shocks. One outcome
of these developments is a new appreciation of
the role that erratic changes in business-sector
productivity play in cyclical fluctuations. Ac-
cording to the real business cycle, or RBC, theory
(arguably one of the most successful shock-
based business-cycle theories to date), random
variation in business-sector productivity is the
key proximate cause of post-WWII U.S. business
cycles.
Let’s now examine the historical process by
1For instance, a boom in residential construction could
reflect speculative excess or changing demographics.  An
increase in the interest rate can eliminate speculation,
but it cannot change demographics.  Thus, policy action
is desirable in the former case but probably not in the
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which business-cycle theorists have come to this
conclusion.
THE STATISTICAL THEORY
OF RANDOM WAVES
The fact that random disturbances may un-
derlie business cycles was clearly demonstrated
by the Russian statistician and economist Eugen
Slutzky.  In an article published in Russian in
1927 (and reprinted in English in
1937), Slutzky described in compelling
detail how chance events could gen-
erate cyclical movements in economic
data.2
Slutzky began with a series of many
random numbers, each an integer be-
tween 0 and 9.  If such numbers are
plotted on a graph, they produce a line
that moves up and down without dis-
playing any particular pattern (Figure
1). This simply reflects the fact that the
numbers, being drawn at random,
don’t bear any relationship to each
other. Next, Slutzky constructed a new
series by adding the random numbers
10 at a time in the following way. The
first number in the new series was the
sum of the first 10 random numbers;
the second number in the new series
was the sum of the second through
the 11th random number, and so on.
Thus, each member of the new series
was a 10-item sum of random num-
bers. In the new series, the difference
in value between adjacent members
could be at most nine, but the differ-
ence between widely separated mem-
2Priority of discovery is attributed to the
British statistician G. Udny Yule, who made
this point in the early 1920s.  However,
Slutzky went much further than Yule in show-
ing how random shocks could lead to ap-
parently cyclical movements in economic (and
other) data.
bers could be much larger.
Slutzky recognized that this combination of
facts—adjacent members of the series are likely
to be similar in value, and widely separated
members are unlikely to be similar in value—
implies wavelike, or cyclical, movement.  Indeed,
when plotted as a graph, the 10-item moving
sums of the random numbers shown in Figure 1
display an unmistakable wavelike pattern (Fig-4 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
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ure 2). While widely separated members of the
series may be quite different in value, such as
members A and B, the movement from A to B
must be gradual because adjacent members of
the series cannot be too different from each other.
To persuade his readers that random numbers
may underlie business-cycle movements,
Slutzky compared a segment of his 10-item mov-
ing-sum series to an index of English business
cycles. As we can see in Figure 3, the similarity
is indeed remarkable!
Following Slutzky’s pioneering work, math-
ematicians further developed the statistical
theory of random waves.  This development re-
vealed that Slutzky’s random-number-based
explanation of irregular cyclical patterns was,
in fact, the most compelling explanation of such
patterns.  This discovery persuaded business-
cycle theorists to seek an explanation of busi-
ness cycles in the cumulative effects of various
random shocks hitting the economic system.
THE GENESIS OF SHOCK-BASED
BUSINESS-CYCLE THEORY
Although Slutzky showed that moving sums
of random numbers could display business-
cycle-like patterns, he didn’t provide any eco-
nomic theory as to why macroeconomic variables
might behave like moving sums of random num-
bers.  However, he did point to examples of me-
chanical systems, such as a pendulum, whose
motion under the influence of random shocks
was, mathematically, a moving (weighted) sum
of random numbers.
Imagine tapping with a hammer a pendulum
whose motion is hampered by friction. If the ham-
mer strokes vary randomly in strength, they’ll
cause the pendulum to swing about in an ir-
regular way. A time-plot of the displacement of
the pendulum from its (vertical) resting position
(with displacement to the right measured as posi-
tive numbers and to the left as negative num-
bers) will show an irregular wavy line.  The keyFrom Cycles to Shocks: Progress in Business-Cycle Theory Satyajit Chatterjee
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point is that mathematically (and experimen-
tally!), the displacement of the pendulum at any
given point in time is a weighted moving sum of
random numbers, the random numbers being
the strength of each hammer stroke up to that
point in time.
In an article published in 1933, the Norwe-
gian economist and Nobel laureate Ragnar Frisch
described a simple macroeconomic model in
which the evolution of output, investment, and
consumer spending resembled the motion of a
swinging pendulum.  Frisch’s model implied
that if some transient random event raised out-
put above the economy’s normal level, all mac-
roeconomic variables (output, investment, and
consumer spending) returned to normal in a cy-
clical fashion.  In other words, the initial periods
of above-normal economic activity (analogous
to displacements of the pendulum to the right)
were followed by periods of below-normal eco-
nomic activity (analogous to displacements to
the left). These swings in economic activity
gradually diminished in strength and eventu-
ally died.
Frisch didn’t work out the behavior of his
model economy for a sequence of random shocks,
but the analogy to the swinging pendulum sug-
gested that the resulting behavior would re-
semble that of business cycles. In any event, by
adopting the swinging pendulum as an anal-
ogy for the evolution of a capitalistic economy,
Frisch took a step back from the prevailing view
that business cycles were self-sustaining. Recall
that without the hammer strokes, the force of fric-
tion brings the pendulum eventually to rest. And
so it is, claimed Frisch, with an economic sys-
tem: without shocks, there are no cycles.
Still, by basing his economic model of busi-
ness cycles on an analogy to a swinging pendu-
lum, Frisch gave inherently cyclical behavior (i.e.,
pendulum-like movements) a prominent place
in business-cycle theory. However, the influence
of the pendulum in business-cycle theory re-
ceived a severe setback when Irma and Frank
Adelman published an article in 1959 showing
that shocks, rather than pendulum-like move-
ments, lie at the center of cyclical volatility.
THE DEMISE OF THE PENDULUM
AND THE RISE OF SHOCKS
By the mid-1950s, advances in econometrics
(the use of statistical methods to determine quan-
titative economic relationships from economic
data) had progressed to the point where equa-
tions describing various sectors of the economy
could be inferred from economic data.  The Klein-
Goldberger model of the U.S. economy was one
such model.3  It contained 25 equations describ-
ing the evolution of 25 macroeconomic variables
for the U.S. economy and was much more de-
tailed than the simple economic model used by
Frisch.
The question that the Adelmans asked was
whether the Klein-Goldberger model could gen-
erate business cycles. First, they simulated the
model on a computer to see if it displayed inher-
ently cyclical behavior. They found that the model
did not display appreciable pendulum-like move-
ments. If some small to moderate transient shock
temporarily raised economic activity, most eco-
nomic variables simply returned to normal with-
out experiencing any periods of below-normal
activity.4
Next, the Adelmans turned to assessing the
role of shocks in cyclical fluctuations.  The first
type of shock they considered was one affecting
observable causal factors.  In the Klein-
Goldberger model, the list of observable causal
factors included changes in short-term and long-
3The model was developed by Lawrence Klein and
Arthur Goldberger, two well-respected econometricians
(Klein received the Nobel Prize in economics in 1980).
The model is described in their book published in 1955.
4In their simulations of the Klein-Goldberger model,
the Adelmans did find pendulum-like behavior for very
large shocks to the economic system.  But these shocks
were much larger than those actually observed for the
U.S. economy.6 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
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term interest rates, an index of hours worked by
those employed, government employee compen-
sation and government expenditures, agricul-
tural exports and agricultural subsidies, and
population and labor-force variables. The
Adelmans noted that these causal factors didn’t
evolve steadily but tended to jump around their
respective trend paths “more or less erratically.”
The Adelmans treated these erratic movements
in causal factors as random shocks and simu-
lated the Klein-Goldberger model to see how
macroeconomic variables behaved in response
to such shocks. They found that these shocks
didn’t “produce the sort of cyclical behavior ob-
served in the actual economy.” Thus, shocks to
observable causal factors did not seem to be re-
sponsible for business cycles, either.
The Adelmans then turned to a second type
of random shock: the random discrepancies be-
tween the predictions of the Klein-Goldberger
model and the actual values of macroeconomic
variables. These discrepancies arise for several
reasons, the most important being that any mac-
roeconomic model is likely to omit some relevant
factors. For instance, the Klein-Goldberger equa-
tion for predicting consumer spending takes into
account only the influence of income; the stock
of liquid assets (cash as well as checking and
savings accounts) held by people; population;
and consumer spending from the previous year.
It ignores any effects resulting from, say, shifts
in the distribution of personal income. If a shift
in the distribution of personal income is an im-
portant factor in some year, that shift will con-
tribute to the discrepancy between the predic-
tions of the model and the actual value of con-
sumer spending for that year. Macroeconomists
refer to such deviations of model-predicted val-
ues from actual values as residuals.
When the Adelmans treated the residuals of
the Klein-Goldberger model as random shocks,
they found that the behavior of macroeconomic
variables in the Klein-Goldberger model closely
resembled actual U.S. business cycles. In other
words, they found that residuals were the prime
source of cyclical volatility!
These results were counter to prevailing views
about the role of shocks in cyclical volatility.
Recall that Frisch and his contemporaries be-
lieved that business cycles resulted from observ-
able shocks impinging on an economy prone to
pendulum-like movements.  But the Adelmans
found that business cycles resulted from unex-
plained shocks (i.e., residuals) impinging on an
economy that displayed no strong tendency to-
ward pendulum-like movement.
Why does the Klein-Goldberger model gener-
ate business cycles even without any strong ten-
dency to pendulum-like movement? The answer
lies in the fact that in the Klein-Goldberger model,
values of macroeconomic variables are deter-
mined, in part, by moving sums of random num-
bers. For instance, the Klein-Goldberger equa-
tion for consumer spending holds that the level
of consumer spending during the previous year
has a positive influence on consumer spending
in the current year. Thus, if some shock raised
consumer spending in the past year, that same
shock will raise consumer spending during the
current year as well, although not by as much.
By the same logic, a shock that raised consumer
spending two years ago will also have raised
consumer spending during the past year (again,
not by as much) and, therefore, will raise it dur-
ing the current year as well. In other words, since
consumer spending in any year is affected by
consumer spending in the previous year, con-
sumer spending in any year is determined, in
part, by a weighted sum of random shocks af-
fecting consumer spending in all previous years.
Now recall Slutzky’s demonstration that a
quantity that’s a moving sum of random num-
bers will display wavelike movement. Thus, in
the presence of random shocks, the link between
consumer spending in consecutive years be-
comes a source of wavelike movements in con-
sumer expenditures.
Most modern macroeconomic models incor-
porate links between consecutive values of mac-
roeconomic variables.  These links imply thatFrom Cycles to Shocks: Progress in Business-Cycle Theory Satyajit Chatterjee
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values of macroeconomic variables are deter-
mined, in part, by moving sums of random num-
bers, and those random numbers are past unex-
plained shocks to macroeconomic variables, i.e.,
past residuals.5 Thus, while it’s true that macro-
economists don’t know which factors cause busi-
ness cycles, they do understand how the changes
brought about by those factors combine to gen-
erate cyclical fluctuations.6
Nevertheless, the fact that residuals cause
business cycles is unsettling for business-cycle
theory. Macroeconomists would prefer to ex-
plain business cycles in terms of observable
shocks or, failing that, to develop theories that
make minimal use of residuals.
THE POWER OF RESIDUALS
Since the 1960s, the evolution of business-
cycle thought has been linked to theoretical de-
velopments in economics in general.  In particu-
lar, advances in dynamic economic theory pro-
vided new and powerful tools for tackling prob-
lems in business-cycle research. Initially, these
new ideas held out hope of reducing the impor-
tance of omitted factors in business-cycle mod-
els and correspondingly raising that of included
factors. Consequently, professional attention
turned to re-assessing the role of factors included
in business-cycle models. A great deal of energy
was spent in assessing the role of monetary
shocks. As it turned out, this assessment failed
to produce a compelling case for monetary
shocks as an important factor in postwar U.S.
business cycles. It also failed to produce com-
pelling evidence in favor of other easily identifi-
able shocks.7 Since the early 1980s, interest has
again shifted to consideration of the role of re-
siduals in cyclical fluctuations.  Armed with the
new advances in dynamic economic theory, Finn
Kydland in collaboration with Edward Prescott
developed a residual-driven business-cycle
model called the real business cycle (RBC)
model.8
Recall that a residual is the deviation of a
macroeconomic variable from its model-pre-
dicted value. In RBC theory, the residual that
generates business cycles is the quarterly devia-
tion of labor productivity from its model-pre-
dicted value. The model of labor productivity
used in RBC theory was developed by growth
theorists in the 1940s and 1950s. This model
holds that average labor productivity (output per
worker) is positively related to the amount of
capital per worker in the economy. The differ-
ence between growth in actual labor productiv-
ity and its model-predicted value is called the
Solow residual, in honor of Nobel laureate Rob-
ert Solow, who developed this idea. A positive
Solow residual, i.e., growth in labor productiv-
ity in excess of what can be explained by growth
in capital per worker, indicates an improvement
5In principle, random shocks to observable causal
factors can also be a source of wavelike movements.
However, the shocks to observed causal factors are too
small to generate realistic business-cycle fluctuations in
the Klein-Goldberger model.
6For evidence on the importance of residuals for cycli-
cal volatility in modern macroeconomic models, see John
Cochrane’s article. Can the omitted factors be discov-
ered by relating residuals to observable historical events?
Perhaps, but scholars are not sanguine about the pros-
pects.  To quote the eminent economic historian Peter
Temin: “If the goal is to find events that can be repre-
sented by the residuals, it may be possible to find events
to explain one set of residuals as easily as another.  But
the variety of models extant today makes that kind of
exercise unrealistic as a way to identify causes of mul-
tiple cycles.”
7Pre-WWII fluctuations are another matter. In that
case, monetary shocks may well have been the decisive
factor.
8Prescott’s 1986 article contains an influential state-
ment of the RBC model.  The antecedents of this article
appeared in an earlier 1982 publication by Finn Kydland
and Edward Prescott.  Two other authors, John Long
and Charles Plosser, published a closely related article in
1983; they coined the term real business cycles.8 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
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in the economy’s technological capability
(brought on by new inventions). In the theory of
economic growth, positive Solow residuals are
seen as a major cause of economic growth; in
RBC theory, fluctuations in the Solow residual
are seen as a major cause of business cycles.9
Two properties of the Solow residual make it
possible to base a business-cycle theory on it.
First, when the Solow residual rises above its
trend path, indicating better-than-average
growth in the economy’s technological capabil-
ity, firms are motivated to invest in new plant
and equipment at a faster-than-average rate. To
meet the increased demand for investment goods,
businesses hire more than the average number
of workers. Above-average employment growth
leads, in turn, to faster-than-average growth in
consumer spending. Thus, a rise in the Solow
residual above its trend path makes investment,
employment, and consumer spending rise above
their respective trend paths as well. This co-
movement of key macroeconomic variables is a
central feature of business cycles.
Second, as was the case with consumer spend-
ing in the Klein-Goldberger model, there is a
strong link between the value of the Solow re-
sidual in consecutive years.  Therefore, the value
of the residual in any given year is determined,
in part, by a weighted sum of random shocks
affecting the residual in past years. Thus, the
observed movements of the Solow residual
around its trend path resemble Slutzky’s mov-
ing sums of random numbers. Since RBC theory
predicts that macroeconomic variables will take
on values that are almost proportional to the
Solow residual, all macroeconomic variables in
the RBC model behave like moving sums of ran-
dom numbers as well. Thus, RBC theory can also
explain the observed wavelike movement of
macroeconomic variables.
RBC theory has had considerable success in
explaining cyclical fluctuations. As shown in
Charles Plosser’s 1989 article, values predicted
by RBC theory (given the observed movements
in the Solow residual) are close to the actual val-
ues of key macroeconomic variables during the
post-WWII period. For instance, as predicted by
the theory, a decline in consumer expenditures,
hours worked, investment, and output accom-
panied the decline in the Solow residual in 1970.
More recently, the faster-than-average growth of
the U.S. economy since 1995 has accompanied a
faster-than-average growth in the Solow re-
sidual. Between 1995 and 1997 (the last year for
which the residual can be calculated), the growth
in the Solow residual exceeded its average
growth rate since 1959 by more than 15 percent.
Still, a natural question to ask about the RBC
model is whether it offers a more satisfactory
explanation of business cycles than the one of-
fered by the Adelmans using the Klein-
Goldberger model. After all, given that both ex-
planations are residual-based, are there any rea-
sons to prefer one to the other?
Quantitatively, the RBC model explains cy-
clical fluctuations at least as well as the Klein-
Goldberger model, as Robert King and Charles
Plosser demonstrated in a 1994 article. However,
many macroeconomists prefer the RBC expla-
nation for two reasons. First, RBC theory relies
on only one residual to generate business cycles
whereas the Adelmans relied on a consumer
spending residual, an investment residual, and
other assorted residuals. Second, the RBC model
is based on straightforward economic ideas
whereas the theory underlying the Klein-
Goldberger model is much more complex and
subtle.
WHITHER BUSINESS-CYCLE THEORY?
The pioneers of RBC theory have steadfastly
maintained that fluctuations in the Solow re-
sidual result from technological and institu-
tional changes. Generally speaking, business-
cycle theorists don’t view their job as explaining
9For a detailed description of the RBC model and
some of its implications, see my 1995 and 1999 articles.From Cycles to Shocks: Progress in Business-Cycle Theory Satyajit Chatterjee
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changes in technology or institutions. So, if the
omitted factors that cause fluctuations in the
Solow residual are truly technological or insti-
tutional in nature, then in one important sense,
RBC theory is complete.  The phenomenon left
unexplained, namely, fluctuations in the Solow
residual, falls outside the scope of business-cycle
theory and therefore doesn’t need to be explained
by it. The intellectual journey begun in 1927 on
the pages of an obscure Russian journal has
come to an end!
But has it really? Economists, after all, are a
curious lot. Confronted with a residual that can
explain business cycles, they will want to dig
deeper into its ultimate causes. One reason re-
searchers are motivated to dig deeper is that some
aspects of the Solow residual seem inconsistent
with the assertion that only technological or in-
stitutional changes cause the residual to fluctu-
ate. For instance, during recessions, the residual
usually declines. The strict RBC interpretation
would hold that some factor caused a decline in
the productive potential of the economy and led
to the recession.  In some cases such an interpre-
tation seems plausible (as it does for the decline
in the Solow residual during the energy crisis in
1974). However, in other cases (for instance, in
1970) the reason for the decline is not clear. Most
macroeconomists find declines in the Solow re-
sidual during recessions puzzling, although
many now believe the declines are real and not
simply the consequence of measurement error.
The future development of shock-based theo-
ries of business cycles is almost certainly going
to be influenced, in part, by attempts to resolve
such puzzles. Indeed, both critics and propo-
nents of RBC theory have focused increasingly
on the reasons why the Solow residual fluctu-
ates.
For instance, critics of RBC theory have pro-
posed models in which the Solow residual moves
in response to cyclical fluctuations caused by
unexplained shifts in investment or consumer
spending. In these models, a higher rate of pro-
duction enables businesses to produce at a lower
unit cost, which implies that the Solow residual
rises during booms and falls during recessions.
These induced changes in the Solow residual
magnify the effects of the initial change in in-
vestment or consumer spending and may lead
to excessive cyclical volatility.10
On the other hand, proponents of RBC theory
point to evidence from U.S. manufacturing plants
that seems to indicate that technological change
is an important determinant of fluctuations in
the Solow residual. If new plants adopt techno-
logical improvements, RBC theory predicts that
such improvements will induce old and obso-
lete plants to cease production. As the new tech-
nology comes into use, both the Solow residual
and national output will rise. U.S. data show
that, as theory predicts, plant closings precede
increases in the Solow residual. Then, as the
Solow residual rises, new plants open and na-
tional output increases.11
As research on RBC theory progresses, we may
expect it to shed light on the questions that vex
policymakers. Is there a policy trade-off between
the rate of economic growth and its cyclical vola-
tility? How can policy contribute to reducing
cyclical volatility? What role do existing
countercyclical policies play in promoting eco-
nomic growth and reducing cyclical volatility?
It is to the credit of shock-based business-cycle
theories, and to the RBC theory in particular, that
progress on these traditional policy concerns can
now be made by learning about the factors that
underlie fluctuations in the Solow residual.
SUMMARY
Early analysts of business cycles believed that
cyclical fluctuations are self-sustaining. But in
10See, for instance, the article by Marianne Baxter and
Robert King and the article by Roger Farmer and Jang-
Ting Guo.
11This theory is described in Jeffrey Campbell’s ar-
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the 1920s, statisticians and economists realized
that business cycles could result from purely
random causes. This discovery moved econo-
mists away from the self-sustaining view of busi-
ness cycles and toward a shock-based view. The
first shock-based business-cycle model gave
prominence to both random shocks and inher-
ently cyclical behavior as sources of business
cycles. But later research demonstrated that
shocks were the major source of cyclical fluctua-
tions.
However, these shocks turned out to be pecu-
liar in nature in that they couldn’t easily be con-
nected to observable real-world events. They
appeared, instead, as deviations of macroeco-
nomic variables from their model-predicted val-
ues (i.e., residuals). Then, in the early 1980s, a
group of economists greatly refined shock-based
(more precisely, residual-based) business-cycle
theories by linking cyclical fluctuations to de-
viations in labor productivity, the so-called Solow
residual. Using the advances made in dynamic
economic theory in the 1960s and 1970s, these
economists demonstrated that fluctuations in the
Solow residual were powerful enough to gener-
ate fluctuations in output that closely resembled
post-WWII U.S. business cycles. This remarkable
demonstration strengthened the links between
business-cycle theory and simple microeconomic
principles and reduced the number of residuals
from several to just one. For both reasons, RBC
theory represents a significant improvement over
first-generation shock-based theories.
Nevertheless, RBC theory doesn’t settle the
issue of the ultimate sources of cyclical volatility
because the random shocks in the RBC model
result from variations in unspecified factors that
cause erratic movements in business-sector pro-
ductivity.  However, by focusing attention on the
role of the Solow residual in cyclical fluctuations,
RBC theory has laid a foundation for better un-
derstanding the causes of such fluctuations.  As
business-cycle researchers look for reasons why
the Solow residual fluctuates, they may gain
knowledge that will help policymakers fashion
better macroeconomic policies.
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